The Emergence of a Black France, 1985–2015: History, Race and Identity by Murphy, David
 THE EMERGENCE OF A BLACK FRANCE, 1985–2015: HISTORY, RACE AND 
IDENTITY 
DAVID MURPHY 
 
On the morning of 8 January 2015, less than twenty-four hours after the violent attack 
on the offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo by the brothers, Said and 
Chérif Kouachi, an unnamed black gunman shot dead a policewoman in the Parisian 
suburb of Montrouge. The murderer, later identified as Amedy Coulibaly, would the 
very next day launch an anti-Semitic attack on the Hyper Cacher supermarket at the 
Porte de Vincennes killing four people. Coulibaly was born in France to parents from 
Mali, and grew up on the notorious housing estate, La Grande-Borne, in Grigny, south 
of Paris.1 Like so many French cités, La Grande-Borne was imagined by its planners 
in the 1960s as a social utopia, the ideal dormitory town; its sinuous, colourful 
buildings would serve as the antithesis of grey postwar brutalist architecture. Instead, 
the cité, which houses 11,000 people (including a large black population), has become 
synonymous with poverty, drug dealing, arms trafficking, youth criminality and 
attacks on police, as well as arson attacks on public buildings. Unemployment 
amongst the inhabitants of La Grande-Borne is estimated to reach the dizzying 
heights of over 40%: it has become the classic example of the state housing scheme as 
social dustbin. 
 By chance, one of the shop assistants in Hyper Cacher on that fateful day was 
Lassana Bathily, a 24-year-old Muslim immigrant from Mali, who risked his own life 
to save some of the shop’s customers, hiding them in a fridge in the basement. In a 
rather telling irony, the police initially thought that Bathily was one of Coulibaly’s 
conspirators and, having finally escaped the hostage situation, the unfortunate shop 
 assistant spent his first 90 minutes of freedom hand-cuffed in police custody. 
However, as the siege ended, relieved customers told police and reporters of Bathily’s 
heroism and he soon found himself lauded by the French public and a political elite 
desperate to draw some positives from the most harrowing week in recent French 
history. An online petition launched two days after the supermarket attack by the 
Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires (CRAN) had, within a week, received 
over 300,000 signatures supporting its request that the President should grant Bathily 
French citizenship and award him the Légion d’honneur.2 On 20 January, he was duly 
awarded French nationality in a public ceremony at the Ministry for the Interior. The 
ceremony was conducted by the Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, and the Interior 
Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, while several other government ministers were in the 
audience, seated alongside representatives of the major religions and, somewhat 
ironically, representatives of the associations that had fought to help Bathily remain in 
France when threatened with expulsion several years previously. 
 Bathily’s story reflects the complexity of sub-Saharan African immigration to 
France: at the age of 15, he left his mother in Mali to live with his father who had 
long been based in Paris; at the end of his studies, he was faced with an ‘obligation de 
quitter le territoire’ but with the aid of some of his former teachers, part of the Réseau 
Éducation sans frontières, he was able to gain a titre de séjour that had been renewed 
annually until the events of 9 January 2015. Valls and Cazeneuve both lauded the 
young man’s bravery, and the Interior Minister attempted, somewhat implausibly, to 
divorce his courageous acts from the decision to grant him citizenship. As Le 
Monde’s reporter noted: 
 
Faut-il croire le ministre de l’intérieur lorsqu’il lui lance un « vous auriez été 
naturalisé, car la citoyenneté française n’est pas réservée aux braves » ? Les 
 données chiffrées ne plaident pas vraiment pour les paroles ministérielles, 
puisque seuls 57 610 personnes ont obtenu la nationalité française par décret 
en 2014.3 
 
The journalist goes on to note, however, that the trend in recent years has been 
towards greater numbers of immigrants being granted French nationality. Indeed, 
Cazeneuve declared that he had ‘relancé le processus de naturalisation, car c’est une 
chance pour notre pays’ and went on to reminisce about his father, ‘instituteur de la 
République’, who had brought children of different religions together in the 
classroom to forge them into French citizens, while Valls reminded the audience of 
his own itinerary, as the Spanish-born son of immigrants to France. The moral of 
these stories was self-evident: the Republican model of integration was still very 
much operative. 
 What do the starkly contrasting stories of these two young men, Amedy 
Coulibaly and Lassana Bathily, tell us about the position of black people in 
contemporary France? In many ways, Coulibaly is the type of nightmare figure who 
not only fuels the perpetually outraged and anxious imagination of Le Figaro and 
other right-wing sources but is also at the heart of a more generalized fear of the non-
white, Muslim other who menaces an idealized secular notion of the Republic. 
Bathily’s case offers an obvious counterbalance to such fears. As Valls’s words had 
stressed, yesterday’s sans-papiers could be today’s Republican hero: the black 
African Muslim immigrant can serve the Republic and become French. 
 This article aims to demonstrate that this duality in the perception of black 
people in France has a long history but it has taken on new forms and gained a new 
urgency over the past thirty years. The notion of a ‘France arabe’ has long had 
political and cultural currency – and was clearly at the heart of Le Figaro magazine’s 
alarmist front cover back in 19854 – but that of ‘la France noire’ is still relatively new. 
 The article will thus explore why ‘Black France’ has now become a common popular 
and critical term. In addition, it will examine some of the main arguments that have 
come to underpin discussion of ‘black’ questions in France, exploring the parameters 
of the ‘black debate’ over the past decade or so and the ways it which has been 
intertwined with the wider ‘postcolonial debate’. Finally, the article will examine a 
handful of key figures who might be seen to represent different facets of this 
emerging ‘France noire’. 
 
The history of ‘Black France’: friends and enemies 
At the end of the First World War, perhaps the best-known and most respected black 
man in France was Blaise Diagne, the Senegalese representative in the Chambre des 
députés. The first black African to be elected to this role, he was initially feared by 
the colonial administration as a threat to French authority in the colonies: however, 
although he pushed for greater rights for the small number of Senegalese who enjoyed 
the status of French citoyens as inhabitants of the quatre communes, Diagne was no 
anti-colonial revolutionary. He soon proved himself a loyal servant of France, not 
least when, in January 1918, he accepted an invitation from Clemenceau, desperate 
for the extra troops that might finally bring the war to a successful conclusion while 
limiting the loss of further French lives, to lead a recruitment tour in French West 
Africa. 
 If the First World War served as a crucible in which the likes of Diagne and 
thousands of African recruits could prove their loyalty to France, then the conflict 
also sowed the seeds of a radical anti-colonialism that would eventually gain 
momentum in the aftermath of the second world conflict. In the mid-1920s, the 
figurehead of black anti-colonial thought and activism was Lamine Senghor, a former 
 tirailleur sénégalais, who had received the croix de guerre for his heroism during the 
war. Senghor first emerged as an activist within the Union intercoloniale, an 
organization created by the French Communist Party to group together anti-colonial 
activists from across the empire. Then, in 1926, he created France’s first genuinely 
popular black movement, the Comité de Défense de la Race Nègre (CDRN), drawn 
largely from the small working-class black communities in the ports and major towns 
across the country. It was in his capacity as President of the CDRN that he was 
invited to deliver a speech at the inaugural congress of the League against 
Imperialism in Brussels in February 1927.5 For the French anti-communist right, 
Lamine Senghor became living proof that the Soviet Union would seek to bring down 
France and its empire through an alliance with its colonial subjects.6 
 It is important not to over-simplify the parallels between the interwar years 
and the present: one can be loyal to France without believing in the values of a long 
defunct empire, while the bête noire of communism, which saw black and white 
activists work together, has today been replaced by a perceived non-white Islamic 
fundamentalist threat. However, one does not need to agree entirely with the authors 
of a recent volume who declare that Les Années 30 sont de retour to identify similar 
patterns at work today to those that operated in the interwar period through which 
black subjects are deemed either loyal or hostile to the Republic.7 Within this binary 
logic, Blaise Diagne can be shown to have proved his loyalty in France’s hour of need 
while Lamine Senghor turned on the nation he had served, acting on behalf of a 
foreign power. As is so often the case with minority groups, any form of dissent or 
opposition to the status quo can be mobilized as grounds to undermine the 
individual’s very right to be considered French. 
  Black people in France do not need to be an Amedy Coulibaly to have their 
loyalty to France questioned. For instance, in the early stages of her career, the French 
novelist Marie NDiaye always insisted that she was simply a writer, not a black 
writer: her Senegalese father had played no real role in her life and she had grown up 
embedded in white metropolitan French culture. In an August 2009 interview given 
by NDiaye to Les Inrockuptibles, she criticised the Sarkozy government’s attempts to 
impose a restricted notion of French identity through its much-derided ‘grand débat 
sur l’identité nationale’ (she declared the France promoted by Sarkozy to be 
‘monstrueuse’). When NDiaye was awarded the Prix Goncourt in November 2009, 
the Inrockuptibles interview was unearthed and the UMP deputy for Seine-Saint-
Denis, Éric Raoult declared that ‘Les prises de position de Marie Ndiaye sont 
inacceptables. […] Une personnalité qui défend les couleurs littéraires de la France se 
doit de faire preuve d’un certain respect à l’égard de nos institutions.’8 The warning 
could not have been clearer: NDiaye’s Frenchness was deemed to be dependent on an 
uncritical acceptance of a perceived status quo. 
 
The rise of black studies à la française 
Over the past five or six years, a wide range of academic and more popular texts, as 
well as wider cultural artefacts – from exhibitions to television series to documentary 
films – have sought to position what is now commonly termed ‘La France noire’ 
within a wider historical framework that extends beyond the wave of mass migration 
that began during the trente glorieuses. The history of black culture in France prior to 
the Second World War had long been dominated by accounts of jazz, Josephine Baker 
and the vogue nègre of the 1920s or, for those more interested in literature, the story 
of Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, Léopold Senghor and the birth of Negritude in the 
 1930s. Many such accounts have sought, with some justification, to celebrate 
France’s famed racial tolerance that was so clearly illustrated during the First World 
War when the coded racial hierarchies at work in the colonial Republic came face to 
face with the brutal segregationist mentality of the US army. 
 Now, though, a wider and more complex history has emerged. For instance, 
the beau-livre, La France Noire (2011), edited by Pascal Blanchard, a leading figure 
in the ACHAC collective of scholars, bore the sub-title ‘trois siècles de présences’, 
promoting a historical engagement that encompasses slavery and colonialism, as well 
as more recent patterns of migration.9 A few months later, a documentary film, Noirs 
de France (2012), co-directed by Blanchard (with Juan Gelas) was screened to 
audiences over three weeks on France 5: the film acted as a tele-visual companion to 
La France noire and its sub-title, ‘de 1889 à nos jours: une histoire de France’, 
declared a similar (if slightly less ambitious) desire to give greater depth to black 
French history.10 A few years earlier, Pap Ndiaye’s La Condition noire (2008), a text 
primarily devoted to the contemporary situation of black people in France, dedicated a 
chapter to exploring ‘une histoire des populations noires de France’.11 One of the 
most high profile historical interventions was provided by the former footballer and 
now activist Lilian Thuram (who will be examined in greater detail below). As its 
sub-title suggests, his best-selling book Mes étoiles noires: de Lucy à Barack Obama, 
outlined a popular black history that extended across the centuries (and, indeed, 
millennia in the case of the prehistoric figure known as Lucy) and was transnational 
in reach.12 Thuram has become a close collaborator with Blanchard and the ACHAC 
collective, working to promote a broad anti-racist agenda, not least through a major 
exhibition at the Musée du Quai Branly in late 2011–early 2012 – Exhibitions: 
 L’Invention du sauvage – exploring the history of ‘human zoos’ in France and 
elsewhere in the Western world.13 
 The centenary of the First World War has witnessed a surge of both official 
and popular initiatives to mark the contribution of colonial, and in particular black, 
troops to the French cause in that conflict. To cite just a few examples, an exhibition 
on ‘les tirailleurs sénégalais et la Grande Guerre’ was launched at the Institut Français 
de Dakar in November 2014; a bande dessinée in the popular series, L’Homme de 
l’année, places a tirailleur at the heart of its story concerning the search for the 
unknown soldier to be interred under the Arc de triomphe in November 1920; and a 
television series Frères d’armes (directed by Rachid Bouchareb in collaboration with 
Pascal Blanchard) featuring fifty short portraits of colonial soldiers (many of them 
black) who fought for France in various wars has been screened on a number of 
French TV channels.14 The material highlighted in these forums may not have been 
new to many scholars, but the impact of these cultural interventions has been to create 
among a wider public a sense of a lost history at last being rediscovered. 
 When taken collectively, these works can be seen to have inaugurated a field 
of black studies à la française, one that has strong roots in the academy but that has 
also proven capable of reaching a much wider public. Pap Ndiaye’s La Condition 
noire was a genuine media phenomenon with some of the more breathless 
commentators appearing to believe that the author had somehow single-handedly 
invented black studies in France, ignoring previous work by both French and 
Anglophone scholars. Although written in a relatively accessible style, Ndiaye’s book 
was a thorough historical-sociological study, full of statistics and it constituted an 
unlikely non-fiction best seller, which has already gone through several editions. In 
the wake of Ndiaye’s book, texts such as those by Blanchard and Thuram also 
 enjoyed popular and critical success. Indeed, Blanchard’s handsomely produced 
volume sold out in the run-up to Christmas 2011, suggesting that the story of 
blackness in France had attained the level of acceptability that allowed it to be offered 
as a stocking filler.15 
 In many respects, the media championing of Ndiaye’s volume mirrored the 
frenzy that had earlier surrounded the edited volume, La Fracture coloniale (2005), 
which was published shortly before the riots that rocked the poor suburbs of many 
French cities in October–November 2005, and was either adopted or rejected 
(depending on the author’s political standpoint) as a useful prism through which to 
attempt to comprehend the events unfolding around the country.16 Indeed, the ‘black 
debate’ that has been launched in France is inextricably bound up in the ‘postcolonial 
debate’ that emerged around 2005 and encompasses the memory of slavery, 
colonization and the position of ‘postcolonial minorities’ within the Republic. Ann 
Laura Stoler summarizes this debate in the following terms: 
 
Colonialism and empire now appear as central threads in the [French] nation’s 
unraveling republican fabric. There is intense disagreement about how they 
figure, whether a focus on the ‘colonial continuum’ strengthens urgent demands 
for social equity or is an irrelevant distraction from them, whether repentance 
and guilt have shaped politics or politics has replaced good scholarship. Some 
would argue that the Republic and Empire are now difficult to view as mutually 
exclusive categories.17 
 
Stoler herself is less interested in such questions than in what she refers to as ‘the 
political, personal and scholarly dispositions that have made the racial co-ordinates of 
empire and the racial epistemics of governance so faintly legible to French histories of 
the present’.18 It is obvious that, for many scholars, race and the French republic are 
now on the research agenda in ways that would have seemed unimaginable three 
decades ago. 
  If postcolonial studies in France became an acknowledged feature of academic 
and public discourse in 2005, then it is no coincidence that the same year also 
witnessed the creation of Le Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires (CRAN), 
at first under the presidency of Patrick Lozès and, since 2011, under Louis-Georges 
Tin: the passing of this role from a Béninois to a Martiniquais illustrating the 
primarily pan-African nature of black groups in France (although this is not to deny 
the existence of important differences in the (self-)perception of black Africans and 
Antilleans, as will be explored further below). CRAN has been a vocal and some 
would say divisive presence in public debate over the past decade, campaigning 
against racial discrimination, demanding greater ethnic representation in French 
public life and, perhaps most controversially, promoting a debate on reparations for 
slavery. CRAN has given a voice to black issues in a more sustained way than would 
have been imaginable in 1985 but its very existence has for some in France acted as 
proof of the rise of an American-style identity politics, whose alleged 
communitarianism is a threat to the universal Republic. 
 At the same time, the encounter between black studies and French studies has 
led to the creation of a distinct area of study in the Anglophone world, not least in 
North America. Dominic Thomas’s Black France (2007), which was published a year 
before Pap Ndiaye’s best seller in France, was a landmark work that brought together 
the different strands of this emerging field of inquiry in a text that examined different 
cultural forms, contexts and historical periods.19 ‘Black France’ has now become a 
clearly identifiable academic area of study: in 2012, an edited volume with the dual-
language title, Black France/La France noire was published by three distinguished 
North American scholars and new courses have sprung up bearing this label (I teach 
one myself at the University of Stirling).20 Notions such as ‘Afropean literature’ have 
 also become prominent within the academy and have offered new transnational 
frameworks within which to situate black writing produced in France.21 As was 
indicated above, discussions of ‘Black France’ are often conducted within the wider 
context of discussions of a postcolonial France, or even of a ‘Racial France’ to use the 
term adopted in the title of a 2011 special issue of Public Culture.22 
 Talk of the emergence of a new field can serve to occlude the existence of 
earlier work already engaging with such issues and there are countless books and 
special issues of journals that one could cite from the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s that 
were already committed to exploration of the black presence in France.23 However, as 
was indicated above, it is no exaggeration to state that, broadly speaking, the notion of 
‘La France noire’ has until recently seemed less of a social or critical given than that 
of ‘La France arabe’: for instance, Alec Hargreaves and Mark McKinney’s 
groundbreaking edited volume, Post-Colonial Cultures in France (1997) contains a 
chapter on the latter topic but no separate chapter on Black France.24 This is largely 
explained by demographics – there are far more ‘Arabes’ in France than there are 
black people – which has given greater visibility to North African culture but has also 
given rise to more pronounced fears regarding a Muslim takeover of France (a fear so 
clearly exploited by Michel Houellebecq in his latest novel, Soumission). Black 
people may predominantly have been viewed at various times in modern French 
history as objects of fear, laughter, contempt or even admiration for their physical or 
sensual qualities but they have rarely induced the sense of existential panic that is 
reserved for ‘les Arabes’. The case of Amedy Coulibaly and the authors of similarly 
violent anti-Semitic crimes – most notably, the brutal torture and murder of Ilan 
Halimi by a gang led by French Ivorian Youssouf Fofana in 2006 – has troubled the 
more benign perception of the black community, and those fears that have arisen have 
 been focused primarily on (Muslim) sub-Saharan Africans. The Antillean population 
in France, which is largely Christian and/or secular Republican, is widely perceived to 
be far more ‘integrated’ than its often Muslim African counterparts. In addition, the 
former are all French citizens who have not generally had to struggle for acceptance 
within metropolitan France to the same degree as persons of sub-Saharan origin, who 
even when born in France are perceived to be ‘foreign’. Whether the broad pan-
Africanist identity that is exemplified by CRAN will survive the spread of such 
polarized perceptions remains to be seen. 
 The current projection of an identity broadly defined as that of a ‘Black 
France’ is undoubtedly, in part, a response to the marginalization of black people in 
France and to the thoughtless categorization of all young people in the banlieues as 
undifferentiated jeunes issus de l’immigration. I would argue, however, that the 
emergence of the notion of a ‘Black France’ has far more to do with the growing self-
awareness and self-confidence of people of colour in France than with the majority 
population’s fears about black people. Rather than attempting an exhaustive overview 
of the different areas of French culture in which black questions have been to the fore 
in recent times – sport, music, cinema, politics, media representations –, the 
remainder of this article will instead focus on two prominent black individuals in 
France whose writings and/or actions have placed them at the centre of debates on 
this emerging Black France: Christiane Taubira and Lilian Thuram. 
 
Christiane Taubira: politics, race, memory 
The French parliamentary deputy for Guyana, Christiane Taubira, is arguably the 
person of colour who has enjoyed the greatest political power and authority in the 
entire Fifth Republic. She was appointed Garde des Sceaux at the beginning of the 
 2012 parliament and, as will be explored below, has in this role been charged with 
piloting through the Assemblée nationale some of the most controversial of François 
Hollande’s policies. First elected to parliament in 1993, she came to national 
prominence in 2001 when she played a central role in the passing of the loi tendant à 
la reconnaissance de la traite et de l’esclavage en tant que crime contre l’humanité, 
which has widely become known as the loi Taubira. A year later, she was the 
candidate chosen by the Parti radical de gauche to stand in the Presidential elections, 
winning 2.32% of the vote (just over 660,000 votes). 
 The passing of the loi Taubira was intended to mark a Republican consensus 
around the history of slavery, signalling recognition of the past suffering endured by 
current French citizens in the Caribbean DOMs: that is, this was primarily a gesture 
towards a group within the contemporary nation. However, in the decade since this 
legislation was passed, it has become all too obvious that no such Republican 
consensus exists. Instead, the loi Taubira inspired right-wing politicians and colonial 
nostalgics to promote similar legislation celebrating France’s colonial past, which led 
to the loi du 23 février 2005, whose infamous fourth clause stated that: ‘Les 
programmes scolaires reconnaissent en particulier le rôle positif de la présence 
française outre-mer, notamment en Afrique du Nord et accordent à l’histoire et aux 
sacrifices des combattants de l’armée française issus de ces territoires la place 
éminente à laquelle ils ont droit’. For their part, French historians have decried the 
interference of legislators in the recording, interpretation and teaching of history from 
whatever political perspective.25 
 Taubira’s activism on issues of racial history has made her a figure of hate for 
many on the right in France. This became evident early in her tenure as Garde des 
Sceaux when she was at the forefront of the Ayrault government’s drive to introduce 
 legislation to legalize gay marriage. It was striking that the virulent right-wing 
Christian opposition to the bill regularly veered off into barely concealed racist slurs 
as is illustrated by three separate incidents in November 2013 at the height of the 
debate: a 12-year-old boy taunted her with a banana at a demonstration against the 
bill; shortly afterwards, Anne-Sophie Leclere, a member of Marine Le Pen’s National 
Front party, created a photo-montage showing Taubira alongside a baby monkey 
(with the captions ‘À 18 mois’ and ‘Maintenant’) which was posted on her Facebook 
page; finally, at the end of the month, the extreme right-wing magazine, Minute, 
placed a photo of Taubira on its front cover alongside the headline: ‘Maligne comme 
un singe, Taubira retrouve la banane’.26 That Taubira’s actions in support of 
legislation with no connection whatsoever to questions of race should elicit such an 
openly racist response is evidence that, for a certain segment of the majority French 
population, the colour of her skin disqualified her from high office. Over the past 
three years, she has thus come to act as a symbol of French diversity and equality 
while at the same time suffering the type of racist abuse that is an absolute denial of 
Republican principles of equality. 
 
Lilian Thuram: diversity and integration 
The multiracial French football team that won the 1998 World Cup were immediately 
heralded as symbols of the successful integration of France’s postcolonial minorities. 
Subsequent events – from the electoral success of Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002 to the 
suburban riots of 2005, through the harshly anti-immigrant tone of President Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s national identity debates to the tragedy of the Charlie Hebdo massacres – 
have underlined the prematurely celebratory nature of this initial response.27 It is in 
this troubled context that the former player Lilian Thuram has decided to use his 
 status as an icon of the 1998 team to become a public figure who regularly speaks out 
on issues of race, identity and memory.28 Thuram was born in Guadeloupe, but his 
family moved to mainland France in 1981, and settled in the Parisian suburb of Bois-
Colombes. He was part of the most successful generation of French footballers, and 
he still holds the record number of appearances (142) for the French national team. 
Thuram thus brings a huge amount of symbolic capital with him into his chosen post-
football role as a public figure seeking to combat racism. 
 Thuram’s numerous interventions on issues of race have over the past decade 
been marked by two key features: firstly, there is a clear rejection of the notion of 
integration, for he consistently stresses ‘le droit à la différence’ which is a deeply 
problematic concept in the context of the universal French republic; secondly, he 
makes consistent use of what Mireille Rosello has identified as a ‘tactical 
universalism’, that is an appeal to the universal values of the Republic to defend 
minority rights.29 For example, in a 2010 interview, Thuram dismissed Sarkozy’s 
national identity debate as follows: 
 
Je ne comprends pas ce questionnement sur l’identité nationale alors qu’elle est 
inscrite sur tous les frontons de mairie: Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité. Ensuite, il y 
a l’identité des Français, ce qui est différent. Chaque personne a sa propre 
identité qu’il construit chaque jour et on ne peut pas gommer ses identités dans 
une tentation jacobine.30 
 
In his 2004 autobiography, Thuram had already reflected on the 1998 World Cup and 
how it had been interpreted by politicians and the media.31 For Thuram, the 1998 
victory had been about the celebration of France’s diversity not the successful 
neutralization of that difference via a conception of integration that he rejected. The 
victory in 1998 was thus symbolic for Thuram precisely because it promised an 
 alternative model for national identity, one that was not based on notions of 
integration. 
 In 2008, the year in which he retired as a professional footballer, Thuram 
established the Fondation Lilian Thuram whose motto is ‘l’Éducation contre le 
racisme’.32 If star footballers from Barcelona (Thuram’s final club) constitute the 
public-friendly face of the Foundation, the website clearly indicates that the 
educational dimension of the project is led by a team of prominent researchers. The 
world-renowned paleoanthropologist Yves Coppens – who identified, in Ethiopia, the 
fossilized remains of ‘Lucy’ as the oldest example of human life on earth – is just one 
member of the eleven-strong scientific committee of the Foundation, alongside other 
prominent figures such as Pascal Blanchard, Michel Wieviorka, the renowned 
sociologist, and Tzvetan Todorov, the literary critic and theorist of race and alterity.  
If his comité scientifique provide the reasoned arguments and in-depth knowledge that 
he lacks, it is Thuram’s celebrity and in many ways his aura of authenticity, as a 
representative from a working-class ethnic minority background, someone who has 
engaged with race and identity in real life rather than solely in textbooks, that 
provides the conduit for these ideas to be debated in a popular public forum. 
 In January 2010, Thuram published Mes étoiles noires: de Lucy à Barack 
Obama, and embarked on a round of print and broadcast media interviews that 
confirmed his transition from sportsman to public figure. (Although Mes étoiles 
noires is his best-known intervention on race, Thuram has consistently contributed to 
public debate on these issues in various ways. He is a regular préfacier to texts 
touching on race – for example, see his preface to Thomté Ryam’s Banlieue noire – 
and has contributed to a number of manifestos on race and multiculturalism, including 
an ‘Appel pour une République multiculturelle et postraciale’ in 2010, and a 
 Manifeste pour l’égalité in 2012.33) As its title indicates (the reference to ‘black stars’ 
deliberately echoing Marcus Garvey), the book is an eclectic series of portraits of his 
‘black heroes’, which stretches from the Lucy discovered by Yves Coppens to the 
current US president. As with his website, the primary impulse behind his book is 
educational. In the introduction, he reflects on the fact that the first time he heard 
about black people in school was when the class studied slavery. The study of slavery 
is of course crucial but what upset Thuram was that there was not a single positive 
role model for black children, and it is this absence that his book seeks to address. If 
his alternative Pantheon contains figures around whom a genuine Republican 
consensus might be found such as the Chevalier de Saint Georges, Nelson Mandela or 
Aimé Césaire, there are other more troublesome figures for a Republican history of 
the French nation: from the Haitian revolutionaries, Toussaint Louverture and Jean-
Jacques Dessalines, to those arch-critics of French (neo-)colonialism, Frantz Fanon 
and Mongo Beti. The task of changing French society is cast in explicitly Fanonian 
terms, which involves the deconstruction of the very ways in which people conceive 
of race: ‘l’âme noire, le peuple noir, la pensée noire n’existent pas plus que l’âme 
blanche, le peuple blanc ou la pensée blanche’.34 He pre-empts and rejects the dreaded 
and inevitable charge that he is engaging in ‘communitarianism’, shattering the unity 
of the universal Republic by promoting communal minority identities: to create a 
truly universal Republic, it is necessary to bring an end to racialized forms of thought 
and perception: ‘Seul le changement de nos imaginaires peut nous rapprocher et faire 
tomber nos barrières culturelles’ (p. 9). When one considers that then French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy had visited the Senegalese capital, Dakar, shortly after his 
election in 2007 to claim that Africa was a continent outside of history, one can 
clearly see that a colonial-era racial imaginaire did not simply disappear with the 
 formal collapse of empire.35 Under Hollande, there have been clear attempts to row 
back from Sarkozy’s racial and colonialist excesses but the open racism towards 
Christiane Taubira that was mentioned above illustrates that racialized thought has not 
disappeared with the passage of the presidency from the right to the socialists. 
 
Conclusion 
In the 2011 film, Intouchables (directed by Eric Toledano/Olivier Nakache), Omar 
Sy, a black French actor of Senegalese origin, plays Driss, an unemployed young 
banlieusard who forms an unlikely odd-couple friendship with the rich paraplegic 
man he is hired to care for. The film was a runaway box office success, attracting a 
remarkable audience of 19 million in France alone. The film was adored by many 
critics who argued that the film finally allowed a predominantly white French 
audience to embrace a black French character, while others dismissed it as a 
rehashing of tired racial clichés. 
 At the other end of the comic spectrum lies Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala who, 
over the past decade, has arguably become the most notorious black figure in France. 
Born to a white French mother and a Cameroonian father, he grew up in a relatively 
privileged middle-class household in the suburbs of Paris. Originally a figure broadly 
of the left, he has gradually veered towards a far right, anti-Semitic agenda that 
manages to embrace aspects of a Front National agenda while simultaneously 
espousing the hate-filled ideas of a minority of the black community towards Israel 
and Jewish people more generally. In typically provocative fashion, he commented on 
Facebook shortly after the terror attacks of January 2015 that ‘Je me sens Charlie 
Coulibaly’, setting his face against the overwhelming expression of solidarity towards 
the victims, instead expressing a grimly comic solidarity with Amedy Coulibaly. 
  I would argue that these final two case studies encapsulate the ambivalence 
surrounding the position of black people in contemporary France. Depending on one’s 
point of view, Intouchables invites us to laugh with, or at, the black male banlieusard. 
However, perhaps most significantly, it also signifies the acceptance of black 
characters within a longstanding, popular French comic tradition. As for Dieudonné, 
he may appear to some in France as the bastard offspring of the light entertainment 
wings of ISIS/FN but what is most striking from my perspective here is that his 
audience is so racially mixed; those who claim most vocally that his inverted Nazi 
salute, the quenelle, is merely an anti-Establishment gesture are often young white 
French people who situate themselves within an anarchic tradition of non-conformism 
that in many respects shares the ethos that informs Charlie Hebdo. Intouchables and 
Dieudonné are quite clearly products of French culture and tradition, but equally they 
ask questions of that culture that would not have been asked 30 years ago. That is as it 
should be, for the French nation of three decades ago is, by its very nature, not the 
same as the French nation in 2015, though contrary to Le Figaro’s alarmism this does 
not of course mean that it is no longer French. 
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